Bar Q and A #16

A. At the time the incident occurred in May 1989, Rozanno was still a minor. Being a minor, Art. 218, (FC) applies. Pursuant to Art. 218, the school, its administrators and teachers shall be liable for the acts of minor Rozanno because of the special parental authority and responsibility that they exercise over him. The authority applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. The field trip on which occasion Rozanno drove the car, was an authorized activity, and, thus, covered by the provision. Furthermore, the parents of Rozanno are subsidiarily liable pursuant to Art. 219 (FC), and principally liable under Art. 221 (FC), if they are negligent.

B. Since Rozanno was 16 years old in 1989, if the incident happened sometime in the middle of 1994, Rozanno have been 21 years old at the time. Hence, he was already of legal age. The law reducing the age of majority to 18 years took effect in December 1989.

Being of legal age, Arts. 218, 219, and 221(FC), are no longer applicable. In such case, only Rozanno will be personally responsible for all the consequences of his act unless his school or his parents were themselves also negligent and such negligence contributed to the happening of the incident. In that event, the school or his parents are not liable under Art. 218, 218 or 221 (FC), but will be liable under general provision on the Civil Code on quasi-delict.

The waiver is not valid. Although the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, they may not do so if such are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy (Art. 1306). The parents' waiver to file a complaint concerning the working conditions detrimental to the moral well-being of their children acting in the movies is in violation of the Family Code and Labor laws. Thus, the waiver is invalid and not binding.

The Child Labor Law is a mandatory and prohibitory law, and the rights of the child cannot be waived as it is contrary to law and public policy.

A. As her lawyer, I can file a petition for habeas corpus on behalf Majorette to recover custody of her child. Since she is the mother of the child that was born out of wedlock, she has exclusive parental authority and custody over the child. Gigolo, therefore, has no right to have custody of the child and his refusal to give up custody will constitute illegal detention for which habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

B. No, he cannot. Both he and Majorette are guilty of violating the provision of the Anti-Child Abuse Law (RA7610) on child trafficking. Being in pari delicto, the parties shall be left where they are and Gigolo cannot demand the return of what he paid.

1. No, the Motion to Dismiss should not be granted. Article 236 of the Family Code as amended by RA 6809, provides in the third paragraph that “nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.”

2. The liability of Julio’s parents to Jake’s parents arises from quasi-delict and shall cover specifically the following:

a. P50,000.00 for the death of the son;
b. Such amount as would correspond to lost earning capacity; and
c. Moral damages.

The sale is voidable. The provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively but only if such application will not impair vested rights. When Rene and Angelina got married in 1980, the law that governed their property relations was the New Civil Code. Under the NCC, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Felipe v.  Aldon (G.R. No. L-60174,  February 16, 1983) and reiterated in Heirs of Ayuste v. Malabonga (G.R No, 118784, September 2, 1999), the sale executed by the husband  without the consent of the wife is voidable. The husband has already acquired a vested right on the voidable nature of dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence, Article 124 of the Family Code which makes the sale void does not apply.

  1. The furniture-making machinery is movable property because it was not installed by the owner of the To become immovable under Art. 415 (5) of the NCC, the machinery must be installed by the owner of the tenement.

  2. It is immovable When there is a provision in the lease contract making the lessor, at the end of the lease owner of the machinery installed by the lessee, the said machinery is considered to have been installed by the lessor through the lessee who acted merely as his agent. Having been installed by the owner of the tenement, the machinery became immovable under Art. 415 of the NCC. (Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, 61 Phil 709)

The warehouse which is a construction adhered to the soil is an immovable by nature under Art. 415(1), and the proper venue of any case to recover ownership of the same which is what the purpose of the complaint to annul the amended Deed of Sale amounts to, should be the place where the property is located, or the RTC of Bulacan.

a) The platform is an immovable property under Art. 415 (9) NCC, which provides that "docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake or coast." Since the floating platform is a petroleum operation facility, it is intended to remain permanently where it is situated, even if it is tethered to a ship which is anchored to the seabed.

b) The equipment and living quarters of the crew are immovable property. Art. 415 (3) of the NCC classifies as an immovable "everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Both the equipment and the living quarters are permanently attached to the platform which is also an immovable. The equipment can also be classified as an immovable property under Art. 415 (5) NCC because such equipment are "machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the industry or works." It is logically assumed that the petroleum industry may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and the platform is analogous to a building.

c) The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden area of the platform are immovable property under Art. 415 (2) NCC which classifies as an immovable property "trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable, the petroleum operation facility.

The right of the registered owners, Joven and Juliana, to file suit to recover their property, is not barred by prescription. Under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Proof of possession by the owner in an action for reconveyance is immaterial and inconsequential. The right to recover possession is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership (Republic v. Mendoza, 627 SCRA 443 [2010]). The right of Joven and Juliana to recover is not barred by laches, either. Laches deals with unreasonable delay in filing the action. The owner’s delay, if any, cannot be construed as deliberate and intentional. They were simply coerced out of Cotabato and threatened with death if they returned, and, thus, could not have filed them.