Bar Q and A #23

1.) In 1986, Jennifer and Brad were madly in love. In 1989, because a certain Picasso painting reminded Brad of her, Jennifer acquired it and placed it in his bedroom. In 1990, Brad and Jennifer broke up. While Brad was mending his broken heart, he met Angie and fell in love. Because the Picasso painting reminded Angie of him, Brad in his will bequeathed the painting to Angie. Brad died in 1995. Saddened by Brad's death, Jennifer asked for the Picasso painting as a remembrance of him. Angie refused and claimed that Brad, in his will, bequeathed the painting to her. Is Angie correct? Why or why not?

No, Angie is not correct. The Picasso painting is not given or donated by Jennifer to Brad. She merely “placed it in his bedroom.” Hence, she is still the owner of the painting. Not being the owner of the Picasso painting, Brad cannot validly bequeath the same to Angie (Art. 930). Even assuming that the painting was impliedly given or donated by Jennifer to Brad, the donation is nevertheless void for not being in writing. The Picasso painting must be worth more that 5,000 pesos. Under Art. 748, the donation and acceptance of a movable worth more than 5,000 pesos must be in writing, otherwise the donation is void, Jennifer remained the owner of the Picasso painting and Brad could not have validly disposed of said painting in favor of Angie in his will.

2.) Anastacia purchased a house and lot on installments at a housing project in Quezon City. Subsequently, she was employed in California and a year later, she executed a deed of donation, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles, California, donating the house and lot to her friend Amanda. The latter brought the deed of donation to the owner of the project and discovered that Anastacia left unpaid installments and real estate taxes. Amanda paid these so that the donation in her favor can be registered in the project owner's office. Two months later, Anastacia died, leaving her mother Rosa as her sole heir. Rosa filed an action to annul the donation on the ground that Amanda did not give her consent in the deed of donation or in a separate public instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an onerous one because she had to pay unpaid installments and taxes; hence her acceptance may be implied. Who is correct?

Rosa is correct because the donation is void. The property donated was an immovable. For such donation to be valid, Article 749 of the New Civil Code requires both the donation and the acceptance to be in a public instrument. There being no showing that Amanda's acceptance was made in a public instrument, the donation is void. The contention, that the donation is onerous and therefore, need not comply with Article 749 for validity is without merit. The donation is not onerous because it did not impose on Amanda the obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price or the arrears in real estate taxes. Amanda took it upon herself to pay those amounts voluntarily. For a donation to be onerous, the burden must be imposed by the donor on the donee. In the problem, there is no such burden imposed by the donor on the donee. The donation not being onerous, it must comply with the formalities of Article 749.

3.) May a person donate something that does not belong to him? Explain.

As a general rule, a person cannot donate something which he cannot dispose of at the time of the donation. (Art. 751)

4.) True or False: A person can dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos.

A person cannot dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos, i.e., an act to take effect during his lifetime. Before his death there is no corpse to dispose. But he is allowed to do so through an act mortis causa, i.e., an act to take effect upon his death.

5.) Spouses Michael and Linda donated a 3- hectare residential land to the City of Baguio on the condition that the city government would build thereon a public park with a boxing arena, the construction of which shall commence within six (6) months from the date the parties ratify the donation. The donee accepted the donation and the title to the property was transferred in its name. Five years elapsed but the public park with the boxing arena was never started. Considering the failure of the donee to comply with the condition of the donation, the donor-spouses sold the property to Ferdinand who then sued to recover the land from the government. Will the suit prosper?

Ferdinand has no right to recover the land. It is true that the donation was revocable because of breach of the conditions. But until and unless the donation was revoked, it remained valid. Hence, Spouses Michael and Linda had no right to sell the land to Ferdinand. One cannot give what he does not have. What the donors should have done first was to have the donation annulled or revoked. And after that was done, they could validly have disposed of the land in favor of Ferdinand.

6.) In 1950, Dr. Alba donated a parcel of land to Central University on condition that the latter must establish a medical college on the land to be named after him. In the year 2000, the heirs of Dr. Alba filed an action to annul the donation and for the reconveyance of the property donated to them for the failure, after 50 years, of the University to establish on the property a medical school named after their father. The University opposed the action on the ground of prescription and also because it had not used the property for some purpose other than that stated in the donation. Should the opposition of the University to the action of Dr. Alba’s heirs be sustained? Explain.

The donation may be revoked. The non-establishment of the medical college on the donated property was a resolutory condition imposed on the donation by the donor. Although the Deed of Donation did not fix the time for the establishment of the medical college, the failure of the donee to establish the medical college after fifty (50) years from the making of the donation should be considered as occurrence of the resolutory condition, and the donation may now be revoked. While the general rule is that in case the period is not fixed in the agreement of the parties, the period must be fixed first by the court before the obligation may be demanded, the period of fifty (50) years was more than enough time for the done to comply with the condition. Hence, in this case, there is no more need for the court to fix the period because such procedure with the condition. (Central Philippine University v. CA, G.R. No. 112127, July 17, 1995)

7.) the donation. In an affidavit he executed on behalf of the congregation, the Minister accepted the donation. The Deed of Donation was not registered with the Registry of Deeds. However, instead of constructing a place of worship, the Minister constructed a bungalow on the property he used as his residence. Disappointed with the Minister, the spouses revoked the donation and demanded that he vacate the premises immediately. But the Minister refused to leave, claiming that aside from using the bungalow as his residence, he is also using it as a place for worship on special occasions. Under the circumstances, can Alfredo and Racquel evict the Minister and recover possession of the property? If you were the couple's counsel, what action you take to protect the interest of your clients?

As counsel for the couple, I may file an action for reconveyance of the property on the ground that the donation was not perfected. It was not perfected because although it was made in a public document, the donee failed to notify the donor of such acceptance in an authentic form before the donation was revoked under Art. 749 of the Civil Code. Such notification was necessary for the donation to become valid and binding.

8.) In two separate documents signed by him, Juan Valentino "obligated" himself each to Maria and to Perla, thus -'To Maria, my true love, I obligate myself to give you my one and only horse when I feel likeIt." - and – 'To Perla, my true sweetheart, I obligate myself to pay you the P500.00 I owe you when I feel like it." Months passed but Juan never bothered to make good his promises. Maria and Perla came to consult you on whether or not they could recover on the basis of the foregoing settings. What would your legal advice be?

I would advise Maria not to bother running after Juan for the latter to make good his promise. This is because a promise is not an actionable wrong that allows a party to recover especially when she has not suffered damages resulting from such promise. A promise does not create an obligation on the part of Juan because it is not something which arises from a contract, law, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts. (Art, 1157) Under Art. 1182, Juan's promise to Maria is void because a conditional obligation depends upon the sole will of the obligor. As regards Perla, the document is an express acknowledgment of a debt, and the promise to pay what he owes her when he feels like it is equivalent to a promise to pay when his means permits him to do so, and is deemed to be one with an indefinite period under Art. 1180. Hence the amount is recoverable after Perla asks the court to set the period as provided by Art. 1197, par. 2.

9.) Roland, a basketball star, was under contract for one year to play-for-play exclusively for Lady Love, Inc. However, even before the basketball season could open, he was offered a more attractive pay plus fringes benefits by Sweet Taste, Inc. Roland accepted the offer and transferred to Sweet Taste. Lady Love sues Roland and Sweet Taste for breach of contract. Defendants claim that the restriction to play for Lady Love alone is void, hence, unenforceable, as it constitutes an undue interference with the right of Roland to enter into contracts and the impairment of his freedom to play and enjoy basketball. Can Roland be bound by the contract he entered into with Lady Love or can he disregard the same? Is he liable at all? How about Sweet Taste? Is it liable to Lady Love?

Yes, Roland is liable under the contract as far as Lady Love is concerned. He is liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code since he contravened the tenor of his obligation. Not being a contracting party, Sweet Taste is not bound by the contract, but it can be held liable under Art. 1314. The basis of its liability is not prescribed by contract but is founded on quasi-delict, assuming that Sweet Taste knew of the contract. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.

10.) Printado is engaged in the printing business. Suplico supplies printing paper to Printado pursuant to an order agreement under which Suplico binds himself to deliver the same volume of paper every month for a period of 18 months, with Printado in turn agreeing to pay within 60 days after each delivery. Suplico has been faithfully delivering under the order agreement for 10 months but thereafter stopped doing so, because Printado has not made any payment at all. Printado has also a standing contract with publisher Publico for the printing of 10,000 volumes of school textbooks. Suplico was aware of said printing contract. After printing 1,000 volumes, Printado also fails to perform under its printing contract with Publico. Suplico sues Printado for the value of the unpaid deliveries under their order agreement. At the same time Publico sues Printado for damages for breach of contract with respect to their own printing agreement. In the suit filed by Suplico, Printado counters that: (a) Suplico cannot demand payment for deliveries made under their order agreement until Suplico has completed performance under said contract; (b) Suplico should pay damages for breach of contract; and (c) with Publico should be liable for Printado’s breach of his contract with Publico because the order agreement between Suplico and Printado was for the benefit of Publico. Are the contentions of Printado tenable? Explain your answers as to each contention.

No, the contentions of Printado are untenable. Printado having failed to pay for the printing paper covered by the delivery invoices on time, Suplico has the right to cease making further delivery. And the latter did not violate the order agreement. (Integrated Packaging Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115117, June 8, 2000. Suplico cannot be held liable for damages, for breach of contract, as it was not, he who violated the order agreement, but Printado Suplico cannot be held liable for Printado’s breach of contract with Publico. He is not a party to the agreement entered into by and between Printado and Publico. Theirs is not a stipulation pour atrui. Such contracts could not affect third persons like Suplico because of the basic civil law principle of relativity of contracts which provides that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. (Integrated Packaging Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 115117, June 8, 2000)