Bar Q and A #24

1.) A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill slope of a city road, suddenly gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized limit in the area, and bumped a car in front of it, causing severe damage to the care and serious injuries to its passengers. Orlando was not in the car at the time of the incident. The car owner and the injured passengers sued Orlando and Diego for damages caused by Diego’s negligence. In their defense, Diego claims that the downhill slope caused the van to gain speed and that, as he stepped on the brakes to check the acceleration, the brakes locked, causing the van to go even faster and eventually to hit the car in front of it. Orlando and Diego contend that the sudden malfunction of the van’s brake system is a fortuitous even and that, therefore, they are exempt from any liability. Is this contention tenable? Explain.

No. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle do not constitute fortuitous event, since the presence of such defects would have been readily detected by diligent maintenance check. The failure to maintain the vehicle in safe running condition constitutes negligence.

2.) AB Corp. entered into a contract with XY Corp. whereby the former agreed to construct the research and laboratory facilities of the latter. Under the terms of the contract, AB Corp. agreed to complete the facility in 18 months, at the total contract price of P10 million. XY Corp. paid 50% of the total contract price, the balance to be paid upon completion of the work. The work stated immediately, but AB Corp. later experienced work slippage because of labor unrest in his company. AB Corp.'s employees claimed that they are not being paid on time; hence, the work slowdown. As of the 17th month, work was only 45% completed. AB Corp. asked for extension of time, claiming that its labor problems are a case of fortuitous event, but this was denied by XY Corp. When it became certain that the construction could not be finished on time, XY Corp. sent written notice cancelling the contract, and requiring AB Corp. to immediately vacate the premises. Can the labor unrest be considered a fortuitous event?

Labor unrest is not a fortuitous event that will excuse AB Corporation from complying with its obligation of constructing the research and laboratory facilities of XY Corporation. The labor unrest, which may even be attributed in large part to AB Corporation itself, is not the direct cause of non-compliance by AB Corporation. It is independent of its obligation. It is similar to the failure of a DBP borrower to pay her loan just because her plantation suffered losses due to the cadang-cadang disease. It does not excuse compliance with the obligation. (DBP v. Vda. de Moll, G.R. No. L- 25802, January 31, 1972)

3.) Are the following obligations valid, why, and if they are valid, when is the obligation demandable in each case? a. If the debtor promises to pay as soon as he has the means to pay; b. If the debtor promises to pay when he likes; c. If the debtor promises to pay when he becomes a lawyer; d. If the debtor promises to pay if his son, who is sick with cancer, does not die within one year.

a. The obligation is valid. It is an obligation subject to an indefinite period because the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so (Art. 1180).

When the creditor knows that the debtor already has the means to pay, he must file an action in court to fix the period, and when the definite period as set by the court arrives, the obligation to pay becomes demandable (Art. 1197).

b. The obligation to pay when he likes is a suspensive condition the fulfillment of which is subject to the sole will of the debtor and therefore the conditional obligation is void (Art.1182).

c. The obligation is valid. It is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e. the future and uncertain event of his becoming a lawyer. The performance of this obligation does not depend solely on the will of the debtor but also on other factors outside the debtor’s control.

d. The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is made a negative suspensive condition to his making the payment. The obligation is demandable if the son does not die within one year (Art. 1185).

4.) Pedro promised to give his grandson a car if the latter will pass the bar examinations. When his grandson passed the said examinations, Pedro refused to give the car on the ground that the condition was a purely potestative one. Is he correct or not?

No, he is not correct. First of all, the condition is not purely potestative, because it does not depend on the sole will of one of the parties. Secondly, even if it were, it would be valid because it depends on the sole will of the creditor (the donee) and not of the debtor (the donor).

5.) In 1997, Manuel bound himself to sell Eva a house and lot which is being rented by another person, if Eva passes the 1998 bar examinations. Luckily for Eva, she passed said examinations. a. Suppose Manuel had sold the same house and lot to another before Eva passed the 1998 bar examinations, is such sale valid? Why? b. Assuming that it is Eva who is entitled to buy said house and lot, is she entitled to the rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the 1998 bar examinations? Why?

a.) Yes, the sale to the other person is However, the buyer acquired the property subject to a resolutory condition of Eva passing the 1998 Bar Examinations. Hence, upon Eva's passing the Bar, the rights of the other buyer terminated, and Eva acquired ownership of the property.

6.) In a deed of sale of realty, it was stipulated that the buyer would construct a commercial building on the lot while the seller would construct a private passageway bordering the lot. The building was eventually finished but the seller failed to complete the passageway as some of the squatters, who were already known to be there at the time they entered into the contract, refused to vacate the premises. In fact, prior to its execution, the seller filed ejectment cases against the squatters. The buyer now sues the seller for specific performance with damages. The defense is that the obligation to construct the passageway should be with a period which, incidentally, had not been fixed by them, hence, the need for fixing a judicial period. Will the action for specific performance of the buyer against the seller prosper?

No, the action for specific performance filed by the buyer is premature under Art. 1197 of the Civil Code. If a period has not been fixed although contemplated by the parties, the parties themselves should fix that period, failing in which, the Court may be asked to fix it taking into consideration the probable contemplation of the parties. Before the period is fixed, an action for specific performance is premature.

7.) In June 1988, X obtained a loan from A and executed with Y as solidary co-maker a promissory note in favor of A for the sum of P200,000.00. The loan was payable at P20,000.00 with interest monthly within the first week of each month beginning July 1988 until maturity in April 1989. To secure the payment of the loan, X put up as security a chattel mortgage on his car, a Toyota Corolla sedan. Because of failure of X and Y to pay the principal amount of the loan, the car was extrajudicially foreclosed. A acquired the car at A’s highest bid of P120,000.00 during the auction sale. After several fruitless letters of demand against X and Y, A sued Y for the discovery of P80,000.00 constituting the deficiency. Y resisted the suit raising the following defenses: a) That Y should not be liable at all because X was not sued together with Y. b) That the obligation has been paid completely by A’s acquisition of the car through “dacion en pago” or payment by cession. c) That Y should not be held liable for the deficiency of P80,000.00 because he was not a co-mortgagor in the chattel mortgage of the car, which contract was executed by X alone as owner and mortgagor. d) That assuming he is liable, he should only pay the proportionate sum of P40,000.00. Decide the defense with reasons.

a) The first defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable as solidary debtor. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors. The demand against one does not preclude further demand against the others so long as the debt is not fully paid.

b) The second defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable. The chattel mortgage is only given as security and not as payment for the debt in case of failure to pay. Y as a solidary co-maker is not relieved of further liability on the promissory note as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.

c) The third defense of Y is untenable. Y is a surety of X and the extrajudicial demand against the principal debtor is not inconsistent with a judicial demand against the surety. A suretyship may co-exist with a mortgage.

d) The fourth defense is untenable. Y is liable for the entire prestation since Y incurred a solidary obligation with X.

8.) Four foreign medical students rented the apartment of Thelma for a period of one year. After one semester, three of them returned to their home country and the fourth transferred to a boarding house. Thelma discovered that they left unpaid telephone bills in the total amount of P80,000.00. The lease contract provided that the lessees shall pay for the telephone services in the leased premises. Thelma demanded that the fourth student pay the entire amount of the unpaid telephone bills, but the latter is willing to pay only one fourth of it. Who is correct? Why?

The fourth student is correct. His liability is only joint, hence, pro rata. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity (Art. 1207). The contract of lease in the problem does not, in any way, stipulate solidarity.

9.) Joey, Jovy and Jojo are solidary debtors under a loan obligation of P300,000.00 which has fallen due. The creditor has, however, condoned Jojo's entire share in the debt. Since Jovy has become insolvent, the creditor makes a demand on Joey to pay the debt. 1. How much, if any, may Joey be compelled to pay? 2. To what extent, if at all, can Jojo be compelled by Joey to contribute to such payment?

1. Joey can be compelled to pay only the remaining balance of P200.000, in view of the remission of Jojo's share by the creditor. (Art. 1219)
2. Jojo can be compelled by Joey to contribute P50.000 Art. 1217. par. 3, Civil Code provides. "When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each."

Since the insolvent debtor's share which Joey paid was P100,000, and there are only two remaining debtors - namely Joey and Jojo- these two shall share equally the burden of reimbursement. Jojo may thus be compelled by Joey to contribute P50.000.00.

10.) Zeny and Nolan were best friends for a long time already. Zeny borrowed P10,000.00 from Nolan, evidenced by a promissory note whereby Zeny promised to pay the loan “once his means permit.” Two months later, they had a quarrel that broke their long-standing friendship. Nolan seeks your advice on how to collect from Zeny despite the tenor of the promissory note. What will your advice be? Explain your answer.

The remedy of Nolan is to go to court and ask that a period be fixed for the payment of debt. Article 1180 of the New Civil Code provides that when a debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period (suspensive). Article 1197 provides that the courts may fix a period if such was intended from the nature of the obligation and may also fix the duration of the period when such depends on the will of the debtor.