No. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle do not constitute fortuitous event, since the presence of such defects would have been readily detected by diligent maintenance check. The failure to maintain the vehicle in safe running condition constitutes negligence.
Labor unrest is not a fortuitous event that will excuse AB Corporation from complying with its obligation of constructing the research and laboratory facilities of XY Corporation. The labor unrest, which may even be attributed in large part to AB Corporation itself, is not the direct cause of non-compliance by AB Corporation. It is independent of its obligation. It is similar to the failure of a DBP borrower to pay her loan just because her plantation suffered losses due to the cadang-cadang disease. It does not excuse compliance with the obligation. (DBP v. Vda. de Moll, G.R. No. L- 25802, January 31, 1972)
a. The obligation is valid. It is an obligation subject to an indefinite period because the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so (Art. 1180).
When the creditor knows that the debtor already has the means to pay, he must file an action in court to fix the period, and when the definite period as set by the court arrives, the obligation to pay becomes demandable (Art. 1197).
b. The obligation to pay when he likes is a suspensive condition the fulfillment of which is subject to the sole will of the debtor and therefore the conditional obligation is void (Art.1182).
c. The obligation is valid. It is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e. the future and uncertain event of his becoming a lawyer. The performance of this obligation does not depend solely on the will of the debtor but also on other factors outside the debtor’s control.
d. The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is made a negative suspensive condition to his making the payment. The obligation is demandable if the son does not die within one year (Art. 1185).
No, he is not correct. First of all, the condition is not purely potestative, because it does not depend on the sole will of one of the parties. Secondly, even if it were, it would be valid because it depends on the sole will of the creditor (the donee) and not of the debtor (the donor).
a.) Yes, the sale to the other person is However, the buyer acquired the property subject to a resolutory condition of Eva passing the 1998 Bar Examinations. Hence, upon Eva's passing the Bar, the rights of the other buyer terminated, and Eva acquired ownership of the property.
No, the action for specific performance filed by the buyer is premature under Art. 1197 of the Civil Code. If a period has not been fixed although contemplated by the parties, the parties themselves should fix that period, failing in which, the Court may be asked to fix it taking into consideration the probable contemplation of the parties. Before the period is fixed, an action for specific performance is premature.
a) The first defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable as solidary debtor. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors. The demand against one does not preclude further demand against the others so long as the debt is not fully paid.
b) The second defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable. The chattel mortgage is only given as security and not as payment for the debt in case of failure to pay. Y as a solidary co-maker is not relieved of further liability on the promissory note as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
c) The third defense of Y is untenable. Y is a surety of X and the extrajudicial demand against the principal debtor is not inconsistent with a judicial demand against the surety. A suretyship may co-exist with a mortgage.
d) The fourth defense is untenable. Y is liable for the entire prestation since Y incurred a solidary obligation with X.
The fourth student is correct. His liability is only joint, hence, pro rata. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity (Art. 1207). The contract of lease in the problem does not, in any way, stipulate solidarity.
1. Joey can be compelled to pay only the remaining balance of P200.000, in view of the remission of Jojo's share by the creditor. (Art. 1219)
2. Jojo can be compelled by Joey to contribute P50.000 Art. 1217. par. 3, Civil Code provides. "When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each."
Since the insolvent debtor's share which Joey paid was P100,000, and there are only two remaining debtors - namely Joey and Jojo- these two shall share equally the burden of reimbursement. Jojo may thus be compelled by Joey to contribute P50.000.00.
The remedy of Nolan is to go to court and ask that a period be fixed for the payment of debt. Article 1180 of the New Civil Code provides that when a debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period (suspensive). Article 1197 provides that the courts may fix a period if such was intended from the nature of the obligation and may also fix the duration of the period when such depends on the will of the debtor.